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Therese Lindgren and Magdalena Sjostrand Ohrfelt have written a 
tantalizing essay.  Intriguing questions and lines of  analysis are suggested to its 
readers, but, like the fruit hanging over Tantalus’s head, which receded as soon 
as he reached for it, some of  the most interesting questions are left hanging. 
Like Tantalus, the audience for this essay is getting its just deserts, insofar as 
we are the ones who maintain the 4500 word limit on PES Yearbook essays, 
but I hold out hope that a future, longer version of  this paper will satisfy my 
desire to hear more.
In this iteration, Lindgren and Ohrfelt note that the Swedish Skolverket 
positions pedagogical documentation within a post-constructionist/posthumanist 
framework.  They situate the Skolverket’s new interest in moving away from 
binary constructions, including culture/nature, human/non-human, mind/body, 
intellect/emotion, and theory/practice, in social conditions both global and 
uniquely Swedish.  Specific to Sweden is the social commitment to state-funded 
early childhood care and education for children as young as one, and the evident 
willingness of  nearly all parents to make use of  such care.  Global trends include 
the interest in measurement, in part for the sake of  competitive international 
comparisons, and a growing belief  that early childhood education is key to a 
nation being able to make its children the winners of  those competitions.  Having 
contextualized posthumanist early childhood education policy, Lindgren and 
Ohrfelt draw on Thomas Popkewitz’s account of  policy as effecting the “fab-
rication” of  particular ways of  being.  They briefly sketch out a “fictional” – in 
Popkewitz’s sense of  fiction as making, as well as making up – account of  the 
posthuman children growing up through Swedish preschools.
“What elements and themes,” Lindgren and Ohrfelt ask, “are accentuated 
when posthumanist theory becomes practicable and is presented as a method 
in educational practice?”  Because they have, appropriately, presented education 
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policy as responding to the perceived problems of  its time, one broad answer 
to this question is the themes and elements raised by social, economic, and 
ecological crises that have captured public attention during the past ten years 
of  European history.  The essay refers in several places to these overlapping 
and interconnected but also distinct crises. With reference to how children are 
fabricated by Skolverket policy, they refer to a “political and philosophical notion 
about the world as being in a state of  (ecological, financial, political, refugee, etc.) 
crisis.”  Towards the end, they claim to have “discussed how the fiction [of] the 
posthuman child is fabricated as a response to the contemporary environmental, 
social, and financial crisis.”  The pages in between, however, address in depth 
only one of  those crises: the ecological.  It is not clear to me whether this is 
because the ecological crisis is the focus of  posthumanist Skolverket policy or 
because Lindgren and Ohrfelt chose to focus on it. In either case, I wanted to 
know more about how posthumanist policy addresses the other crises.  
What really leaves me wishing for more, though, is a tension they allude 
to in the conclusion, which points directly to the other, unaddressed, crises. 
Lindgren and Ohrfelt point out that in a posthumanist approach, the child is 
fabricated “as a prophetic being at the same time as it is wiped out (through the 
dissolution of  the subject).”  A posthuman child, arguably, has no human rights. 
Even if  this entails no more than the replacement of  one set of  fictions with 
another, where does this leave Syrian, Libyan, and other refugee children? These 
children have been brought to Europe not out of  their parents’ commitment 
to living holistically with the natural world but rather out of  desperate faith in 
a Europe that has imagined itself  as a bastion of  rights protected by law, at the 
national, regional, and international levels.  Human rights, of  course, have been 
honored in the breach for as long as they have been signed into international 
conventions.  At the present moment, however, disregard for national and in-
ternational laws and treaties heralds not a new posthumanist state of  genuine 
mutual respect but, instead, nationalist chauvinism.   How, without human rights, 
will the refugees’ hopes be addressed?  How can posthumanism respond to 
the ugly nativism sweeping Europe (and the United States, of  course), which 
promises to treat native-born children entirely differently than immigrant and 
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refugee children? The recognition of  this tension, in my reading, is where the 
essay starts to get really interesting.
I am not convinced Lindgren and Ohrfelt could have discussed all the 
crises they mention – social and financial, as well as ecological – in 4500 words, 
especially given their commendable commitment to providing scholarly refer-
ences.  Even if  they more explicitly tied the refugee crisis, the financial crisis, 
and the ecological crisis together (as surely could be done, but would require 
explanation), the essay would be significantly longer. 
In 1999, Francis Schrag published a paper called “Why Foucault Now?.” 
In it, he argued that education scholars (including, prominently, his colleague 
at UW Madison, Thomas Popkewitz) were drawn to Foucault at that particular 
moment because Foucault offered a stance on education, power, freedom, 
and the potential of  politics to make a difference that spoke to hopes raised 
by social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, hopes that were dashed by the 
conservatism and infighting of  the 1980s and 1990s.   Rather than promising a 
road to utopia through revolution, Foucault’s writing offers critique that aims to 
promote change by puncturing complacency.   And with revolutionary Marxism 
hard to believe in after 1989, Foucault offered, in Schrag’s words, an appealing 
means “for scholars, especially those with a flair for theorizing, to believe that, 
no matter how esoteric or precious their formulations, and no matter how 
limited their audiences, they are, even as they theorize, social activists engaged 
in laying the ground for social transformation.”1 
Suppose that, instead of  taking Schrag’s word as a settled verdict on 
Foucault, on Popkewitz, and on scholarship like Lindgren’s and Ohrfelt’s, which 
incorporates Foucaultian modes of  critique, readers take it as a gauntlet thrown 
at their feet. Why posthumanism now?  Why dissolve human autonomy at the 
precise moment when refugees are streaming into Europe to claim their share 
of  what the Enlightenment has produced?   Is this because posthumanism 
shows the way to a politics that can supersede the binary thinking that supports 
colonialism, the exploitation and degradation of  the earth, and the dehuman-
ization of  others?  Or is it merely an attempt to give up on politics at exactly 
the moment when future citizens of  Europe (and the United States, Canada, 
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and Australia) include Muslims, Africans, and others of  the global poor?  Fou-
caultian scholarship on educational policy, including Popketwitz’s account of  
fabrication, has enriched readers’ understanding of  politics by shifting our focus 
from the political to the ontological.  Only by attending to the ontological, can 
philosophers of  education consider what other ways of  being in the world 
education might make possible.  After that, though, these new fabrications will 
still have to find a way to live together, and that is the work of  politics. When 
posthumanism is carried into policy, carried out by human beings as all policy 
is, the questions become political once again. 
By bringing posthumanist inquiry into the domain of  educational policy, 
the Skolverket raises such questions.  In this essay, Lindgren and Ohrfelt have 
taken an initial look at some of  the questions posthumanist education policy 
raises.  I look forward to hearing more. 
1 Francis Schrag, “Why Foucault Now?,” Journal of  Curriculum Studies 31, no. 4 
(1999): 375-383, 382.
